In this paper we model a job-specific shock process in the matching model of unemployment with non-cooperative wage behaviour. We obtain endogenous job creation and job destruction processes and study their properties. We show that an aggregate shock induces negative correlation between job creation and job destruction whereas a dispersion shock induces positive correlation. The job destruction process is shown to have more volatile dynamics than the job creation process. In simulations we show that an aggregate shock process proxies reasonably well the cyclical behaviour of job creation and job destruction in the United States.
INTRODUCTION
Recent microeconomic evidence from the U.S. and other countries has shown that largejob creation and job destruction flows co-exist at all phases of the business cycle.' Individual establishments have diverse employment experiences even within narrowly defined sectors and regardless of the state of aggregate conditions. In this paper we develop a model of endogenous job creation and job destruction and incorporate it into the matching approach to equilibrium unemployment and wage determination. In our model, establishments have diverse experiences because of persistent idiosyncratic shocks. We examine the implications of the model for the processes of job creation and job destruction and for the aggregate behaviour of unemployment and job vacancies.
The economy we examine has a continuum of jobs that differ with respect to values of labour product. Each job is designed to produce a single unit of a variation on a common product. Each variation is unique to the job and commands a relative price that is subject to idiosyncratic risk, due to either taste or productivity shocks. A key assumption is that investment is irreversible, so an existing job cannot switch the variation of its product once the job has been created. But before creation, technology is fully flexible and the firm can choose the variation of its product. We model the idiosyncratic risk for existing jobs as a jump process characterized by a Poisson arrival frequency and a drawing from a common distribution of relative prices. Large negative shocks induce job destruction but the choice of when to destroy the job is the firm's.
Job creation depends on the information available to potential employers. In empirical work two sources of new jobs are usually given, existing firms and new entrants. Most new job creation over the cycle is by existing firms; in Haltiwanger's (1990, 1991 ) study of U.S. manufacturing establishments, firms three years or under account for only about 18% of total job creation. Existing firms have good information about the profitability of new differentiated products within their sectors, so a natural assumption to make is that new jobs are more productive than existing ones. We take this assumption to its extreme and assume that newly-created jobs are the most profitable in the market. An assumption of this kind is less easily justified if job creation is by new entrants, a route that we do not pursue here.2
Following on from our assumption that idiosyncratic risk is job-specific, we also model the matching process as taking place between individual job vacancies and unemployed workers, rather than between multiple-job firms and workers. Consequently, with the productivity of new jobs at the upper support of the distribution and a large number of potential jobs, there is a zero-profit condition for a new job vacancy that can produce the most highly valued product in the market. Given our assumption of constant returns in the matching technology, zero expected profit on a new vacancy is equivalent to a marginal productivity condition for any job -that produces the most highly priced product variation.3
Wages are the outcome of a bilateral bargain that takes place when unmatched jobs and workers meet and is revised continuously in the face of productivity shocks. An equilibrium is a time path for the number of job/worker matches (and hence employment) implied by the matching law and rational non-cooperative behaviour by individual workers and employers. We study both the aggregate steady state of the equilibrium deterministic process and the dynamic adjustments in response to persistent aggregate shocks.
In the next section, various concepts and notation are defined. Following that, in Section 3, the implications of micro and macro parameters for job creation and job destruction and for steady-state vacancy and unemployment levels are derived. The effects of persistent "cyclical" changes in the common macro and micro parameters are studied in Section 4. Section 5 simulates an example of the model and shows that our model solutions proxy reasonably well the observed behaviour of job creation and job destruction found in the U.S. data.
CONCEPTS AND NOTATION
Each firm has one job that can be in one of two states, filled and producing or vacant and searching. Jobs that are not actively producing or searching are destroyed. Following the empirical literature, we say that job creation takes place when a firm with a vacant job and a worker meet and start producing; opening a new job vacancy is not job creation, 2. New entrants have on average shorter lives than existing firms, which would contradict our assumptions. In a recent paper related to ours, Caballero and Hammour (1991) study the cyclical behaviour of job creation and job destruction in a vintage model of embodied technical change by assuming that new entrants adopt the most advanced technology. Another recent paper that addresses the question of cyclical changes in job creation and job destruction is by Bertola and Caballero (1991) , where existing firms move probabilistically between two states, good and bad, and jobs form after a matching process.
3. For more discussion of the unemployment model see the book by Pissarides (1990) and the stochastic generalization and calibration by Mortensen (1990). though we might refer to it as creating a job vacancy. Job destruction takes place when a filled job separates and leaves the market.
Similarly, workers can be either unemployed and searching or employed and producing. We do not consider search on the job to avoid complicating the model, though our assumptions on technology and wages imply that there are incentives to search on the job, unless the cost of on-the-job search is too high.4 Wages are chosen so as to share at all times the surplus from a job match in fixed proportions. The worker's share is fl.5
Consequently, more productive jobs offer higher wages and since job vacancies are characterized by the best technology in the market, new jobs offer the highest wage.
Each job is characterized by a fixed irreversible technology and produces a unit of a differentiated product whose price is p + uc. This price can be referred to as either the productivity of the job or simply as its price. p and a are common to all jobs whereas ? is job specific. p is an aggregate component of productivity that does not affect the dispersion of prices. The parameter a reflects dispersion, an increase in a representing a symmetric mean preserving spread in the job-specific shock distribution or equivalently an increase in price variance.
The process that changes the idiosyncratic component of price is Poisson with arrival rate A. When there is change, the new value of ? is a drawing from the fixed distribution F(x), which has finite upper support cu and no mass points. Without further loss of generality, F(x) can be endowed with zero mean and a unit variance so that a is the standard deviation of the job-specific component au.6
Modelling the arrival process as Poisson implies persistence in job-specific shocks, but conditional on change, the firm's initial conditions do not affect its next price. Exogenous events that affect the persistence or distribution of idiosyncratic shocks (micro shocks) shift A and a respectively. Events that affect the productivity of all jobs by the same amount and in the same direction (macro shocks) are reflected in changes in the common price component p.
Firms create jobs that have value of product equal to the upper support of the price distribution, p + asu. Once a job is created, however, the firm has no choice over its productivity. Thus, job productivity is a stochastic process with initial condition the upper support of the distribution and terminal state the reservation productivity that leads to job destruction. Both job creation and job destruction are costless, so we can either assume that the firm can choose its technology after it is matched to a worker or before it is matched, with identical results. In the latter case, when a vacancy is hit by an idiosyncratic shock it exits and re-enters at the best technology, so all active vacancies can produce the product variation that commands price p + Eu. Filled jobs, however, do not always exit when they are hit by shocks, because there is a cost of recruiting, modelled as a per-unit cost of maintaining a vacancy, c. Existing filled jobs are destroyed only if the idiosyncratic component of their productivity falls below some critical number Ed < u. Therefore, the rate at which existing jobs are destroyed is AF(Ed).
The rate at which vacant jobs and unemployed workers meet is determined by the homogeneous-of-degree-one matching function m(v, u), where v and u represent the number of vacancies and unemployed workers respectively, normalized by the fixed labour 
In order to determine the productivity-contingent wage, w(?), we denote the worker's asset value from a match with idiosyncratic component ? by W(E) and his asset value from unemployment by U. Total match surplus is S(e) = J(A) + W(E)-U.
The wage is set to split the surplus in fixed proportions at all times, so
where fi is a constant between 0 and 1.
Since firms have the option of closing jobs at no cost, a filled job continues in operation for as long as its value is above zero. Hence, filled jobs are destroyed when a productivity shock x arrives that makes J(x) = (1 -P)S(x) negative. For any realization ?, J(E) solves, 
Finally, the present value of income of an unemployed worker is defined by
where b is thfe exogenous value of leisure or unemployment income.
Adding up the value expressions (5)- (7) The left-hand side of (10) is the lowest price acceptable to firms with a filled job. This is less than the opportunity cost of employment because of the existence of a hiring cost. The opportunity cost of employment to the worker is the value of leisure b plus the expected gain from search, which in equilibrium is equal to the second term on the righthand side of (10). The third term is a measure of the extent to which the employer is willing to incur an operational loss now in anticipation of a future improvement in the value of the match's product, i.e., it is the option value of retaining an existing match. That this is positive is indicative of the existence of "labour hoarding" at low price realizations.8
Holding the v/u ratio constant, it is easily established by differentiation that the reservation productivity gd decreases with the difference between the aggregate productivity parameter, p, and the value of leisure, b. It is also easily established that because the decrease in gd increases the option value of a job, the increase in p reduces the reservation price p + USd: the range of prices observed at higher common price expands.
The term flcv/(l -f)u stands for the expected gain from search, which, without onthe-job search, has to be given up when the worker accepts a job. A higher expected return from search increases the opportunity cost of employment and so leads to higher Ed and to more job destruction.
An increase in A increases the option value of a job because job-specific product values are now less persistent. So, at higher A a job experiencing a bad shock is less likely to be destroyed. In contrast, a higher discount rate, r, reduces future profitability at all 7. The reservation productivity, or price, is obviously p + a6d . We refer to ed as the reservation productivity to avoid the more cumbersome reservation value of the idiosyncratic component of productivity.
8. It can easily be checked that if c=O, J(eu) =0 from (1) and (2) and so 8d= Eu: given the exogeneity of p, b and a, jobs are either created at the upper support of the price distribution or destroyed without limit. prices, and so reduces the option value of waiting for an improvement. Thus, given v/u, A decreases Ed and r increases it.
The relation between the variance of the idiosyncratic shock, a, and Ed is in general ambiguous. Higher a implies that the more profitable jobs become even more profitable but less profitable jobs suffer a price reduction. Since the price of operational jobs, however, is given by p + as for Ed ? e _ Eu, the higher a necessarily implies a general improvement in the productivity of existing jobs, though some of the existing jobs may become less profitable. Generally speaking, the reservation productivity is higher when a is higher, increasing the rate of job destruction, when the marginal job is less profitable at the higher a. Differentiating (10) Given v/u, Ed increases in a if p exceeds the opportunity cost of employment. In this case (10) implies that Ed is a negative number, so the productivity of the marginal job is lower at higher a. Since, however, a improves the option value of the job, the cutoff point where higher a implies more job destruction is not Ed = 0 but some Ed < 0
It is reasonable to assume that p exceeds the opportunity cost of employment. First, it implies that a labour market equilibrium exists at all (non-negative) values of a. Second, it implies that not all prices in the truncated price distribution, with range p +a Ed to p + usu, increase when a increases, making a a more appealing measure of dispersion in an empirical price distribution. In the discussion that follows we assume that the conditions for a positive effect of a on gd are satisfied.
The solution for the other two unknowns of the model, vacancies and unemployment, is obtained from (1) and (2) and the steady-state condition for unemployment. To write (2) in a more convenient form, note that ( (10) and the curve JC the job creation condition (13). JD slopes up because at higher v/u the opportunity cost of employment is higher, so there is more job destruction. JC slopes down because at higher Ed job destruction is more likely, so there is less creation.
As earlier explained, for given v/u an increase in common price p or a decrease in the exogenous cost of employment b shifts JD to the left, so the equilibrium v/u increases and the equilibrium gd decreases. An increase in A shifts JD to the left and JC down, so it decreases Ed. The diagram gives an ambiguous effect on v/u but differentiation of (10) and (13) with respect to A shows that the negative effect through JC always dominates (see the Appendix). By contrast, an increase in r shifts JD to the right and JC down, so it decreases v/u, with ambiguous effects on gd (see the Appendix). The joint determination of v/u and 8d
The effect of disperion, a, is to increase v/u at given Ed and so shift JC up. It also increases Ed at given v/u, so it shifts JD to the right. The overall effect is an increase in E.9 As with A, the diagram gives an ambiguous effect on v/u but it can be established by differentiation that v/u unambiguously increases in a, regardless of the relation between p and b (see the Appendix).
The It is conventional to draw the Beveridge curve convex to the origin in vacancyunemployment space, but differentiation of (14) shows that in this model there is an ambiguity about the curve's precise shape. On the one hand, higher vacancies imply more job matchings, so unemployment needs to be lower for stationary matching rate. On the other hand, higher vacancies also imply more job destruction, through the effects of v/u on Ed, so unemployment needs to be higher to maintain stationary job destruction rate. Thus, whether the curve slopes down or not depends on the relative strength of each effect. In models without an endogenous job destruction rate only the former (matching) effect is present and in that case the homogeneity of the matching function ensures that the Beveridge curve is convex to the origin. Since empirically that shape is more plausible, we shall assume here that the matching effect on the Beveridge curve dominates the job destruction effect and the curve slopes down. This is shown in Figure 2 .
In order to obtain the steady-state equilibrium vacancy and unemployment combination we draw a line through the origin to represent the equilibrium solution for v/u, obtained from (10) and (13) Equilibrium vacancies and unemployment condition. Given the reservation productivity, equilibrium vacancies and unemployment are given at the intersection of the job creation condition and the Beveridge curve.
The job creation flow is m(v, u) and the job destruction flow is AF(ed)(I -u). The analysis that follows derives the initial impact of parameter changes on each conditional on current unemployment, u. Obviously, unemployment eventually adjusts to equate the two in steady state. Note that an increase in job creation rotates the job creation condition up in v/u space while an increase in job destruction shifts the Beveridge curve out.
A positive net aggregate productivity shock, represented by either an increase in p or a fall in b, increases v/u and decreases Ed, so it rotates the job creation condition in Figure  2 up and shifts the Beveridge curve in. In other words, job creation increases and job destruction decreases in response to a positive macro shock. Eventually, unemployment falls but the effect on vacancies is ambiguous. The differences between these implications and those of the pure matching model is the shift in the Beveridge curve and the resulting ambiguity of the vacancy effect.
An increase in the variance of the idiosyncratic shock increases both job creation and job destruction. Its effects in vacancy-unemployment space are to shift the Beveridge curve out and rotate the job creation line up. Equilibrium vacancies increase but the effect on unemployment is ambiguous.
In contrast, a reduction in persistence, shown by an increase in A, rotates the job creation condition down and shifts the Beveridge curve out, given the reservation productivity. The effect on job destruction is mitigated and can be reversed in principle, thus not shifting the Beveridge curve, by the reduction in the reservation productivity induced by an increase in shock frequency. Whether or not a sign reversal occurs depends critically on the magnitude of the discount rate, r, and on the extent of the dispersion in the shock, a, as the effect of A on the reservation productivity falls with either (the direct effect tends to zero as r-+0 or c -+0) by virtue of (10).
CYCLICAL SHOCKS
In this section we extend the model to the case where one of the aggregate variables changes probabilistically. We model in detail the case where the common price component p takes two values, a high value p* and a low value p, according to a Poisson process with rate p. The Poisson process captures the important feature that characterize cyclical shocks, a positive probability less than one that boom or recession will end within a finite period of time. We also discuss the cyclical implications of changes in the disperion of the job-specific shocks. The purpose of this analysis is to bring out the differences between the steady-state equilibrium studied so far and the equilibrium obtained when there is anticipation of aggregate productivity change.
In the model of Section 3 the steady-state equilibrium solutions for Ed and v/u for a given price p are given by equations (10) 
The steady-state analysis leads us to expect that since p* >p, E* < Ed and (v/u)* > v/u. Therefore, when price drops from p* to p, some marginal jobs are immediately destroyed and some vacancies close down. In contrast, when price increases from p to p*, new vacancies are opened up but nothing happens to employment on impact. This asymmetry will turn out to have an important cyclical implication for the behaviour of the job creation and job destruction rates.
As before, jobs are destroyed whenever their value falls below zero. Equations ( In contrast to the reservation productivity during boom, the probability that price will increase increases the option value of the marginal job in recession. Thus, firms are less likely to destroy a job in recession the higher the transition rate to the boom. (24) show that when cyclical shocks are anticipated, the gap between the reservation productivity at high and low common price is less than implied by the steady-state analysis. The gap grows as the probability of changing state (measured by the Poisson rate p) falls. Apart from that change, however, the previous analysis still holds, with a higher probability that a given job will be destroyed in recession, following an idiosyncratic shock, than in the boom. Job creation is found by computing the value of jobs at the upper support of the price distribution. From (16) we can write 
Conditions (20) and
Solving (25) and (26) gives,
Given the reservation productivity, this is the same expression as the one holding in the steady state, (12). Therefore, vacancy creation in recession solves an expression similar to (13),
Equations (17) and (18) Therefore, comparing with (13), even for given reservation prices job creation in the boom is less when there is the expectation of cyclical change. Now a comparision of (30) with (28) shows that (v/u)* > v/u, i.e. that there is more job creation in the boom than in recession. The fact that Ed> 80, however, implies that when the cyclical shocks are anticipated (i.e. when p > 0), the job creation rate is likely to exhibit less cyclicality than when p = 0. For given values of the reservation productivities, p > 0 leaves job creation at low p unaffected, as in (28), but reduces the higher job creation rate at high p, as in (30). Of course, p also influences the reservation productivities but an examination of the job creation conditions shows that that influence is not likely to influence job creation in one state differently from job creation in the other state.
The anticipation of cyclical shocks narrows the gap between the reservation productivities at the two prices, p and p*, so job destruction fluctuates less as price changes than a comparison of the two steady states would imply. But the adjustment dynamics of job destruction as price changes are likely to increase the cyclicality of the job destruction rate, at least for a short period after the change in price. Consider first what happens when price increases from p to p*. Firms open up more job vacancies and hold on to more jobs after unfavourable job-specific shocks. Thus the job creation rate, vq(v/u), increases and the job destruction rate, (1 -u)AF(ed), decreases, inducing a fall in unemployment through (15). Since neither v/u nor cd has dynamics of its own at given p, the decrease in unemployment induces a fall in job creation (to maintain v/u constant v has to fall when u falls) and an increase in job destruction, until there is convergence to a new steady state, or until there is a new cyclical shock.
When price falls from p* to p the dynamics of job creation follow a pattern similar to that after the price increase: (v/u)* falls once for all, job creation falls on impact but again increases as unemployment begins to rise. The dynamics of job destruction, however, are different, because the rise in the reservation productivity from E* to Ed Jeads to an immediate destruction of all jobs with idiosyncratic components between the two reservation productivities. Job destruction also rises for reasons similar to the ones that led to its decrease when price increased, since with higher reservation productivity firms are more likely to destroy jobs as they are hit by job-specific shocks. But the increase in job destruction immediately after the cyclical downturn has no counterpart in the behaviour of the job destruction rate when price increases, or in the behaviour of the job creation rate. This imparts a cyclical asymmetry in the job destruction rate and in the dynamic behaviour of unemployment. The short-run cyclicality of the job destruction rate increases, the job destruction rate leads the job creation rate as a cause of the rise in unemployment and the speed of change of unemployment at the start of recession is faster than its speed of change at the start of the boom.
At this level of generality, our analysis is not yet in a position to confirm the empirical findings on the cyclical behaviour of job creation and job destruction. But the results of this section are consistent with some of those findings. Firstly, job creation and job destruction move in opposite directions when the economy is hit by a cyclical shock, as in the model of this paper. Secondly, empirically job creation fluctuates less than job destruction. Our analysis has shown that if we take the steady-state analysis as a yardstick, the anticipation of cyclical shocks causes an asymmetry in job creation, reducing it in the boom but not in recession. Since in the boom job creation is already higher, this result is consistent with the finding that it does not fluctuate much. No such arguments can be made for job destruction. Thirdly, our analysis has shown that if we take the short-run dynamics into account, there is also an asymmetry in job destruction which is consistent with the finding that job destruction is more "cyclical". Job destruction increases more rapidly and by more at the start of recession than it decreases at the start of the boom. The latter claim is also consistent with observations on the behaviour of unemployment, that entry into unemployment leads exit as the cause of the rise in unemployment. The simulation of the next section confirms these claims.
In contrast, the cyclical implications of (probabilistically) anticipated changes in the dispersion of prices, as measured by the dispersion parameter a, are not consistent with the empirical findings in two out of the three predictions listed in the preceding paragraph. If dispersion follows a Poisson process with a high value a and a low value au*, job creation and job destruction move in the same direction as a fluctuates. The anticipation of changes in cf increases job creation when a rises, over and above its already high steady-state value. But as previously, job destruction rises more rapidly when a rises than it falls when a falls.
These claims can be demonstrated with an analysis similar to the analysis of the effects of cyclical changes in common price, which we sketch here. Suppose u> a* and let p be the Poisson rate that changes dispersion. Common price is fixed at p, assumed to be at least as high as the opportupity cost of employment b. The steady-state analysis implies that there is more job destruction and more job creation at high a, i.e. (31) that is, the direct effect of dispersion on job creation dominates the indirect effect that operates via the reservation productivity. Therefore, (30) implies that as in the steadystate analysis, there is less job creation at low or* even if p = 0, but if p > 0, job creation at a* is lower still. The cyclical responses of job creation are enhanced when the driving force is dispersion.
In terms of the dynamics, a fall in a is followed by a lowering of the reservation productivity and by closing down some job vacancies. This leads to a fall in both job destruction and job creation, with ambiguous effects on unemployment from the start.
But a rise in dispersion causes an immediate rise in job destruction, as the reservation productivity is increased, which causes an immediate rise in unemployment. Job creation also rises in this case and eventually there is convergence to a new steady state, where although there is again ambiguity about the final direction of change in unemployment, it is almost certainly the case that unemployment falls towards its new steady-state value after its initial rise.
AN ILLUSTRATIVE SIMULATION
As a further check on the consistency of our main results with those found in the data, we simulate here a version of our model and compare the results with existing stylized facts concerning the cyclical behaviour of job creation and job destruction. For both the U.S. and several European economies, these flows are relatively large and negatively correlated. Furtheremore, job destruction is more volatile than job creation. One of the main questions that we ask is whether shocks to common price p are by themselves enough to simulate the observed negative correlation between job creation and job destruction and the higher variance in job destruction.
As a necessary preliminary, the equilibrium conditions and laws of motion are stated for a general model, one that simply restricts the aggregate shock to be a Markov process. In this case, an equilibrium can be characterized by two functions of the common component of price p: the job meeting rate per searching worker, a(p), and the job destruction cutoff value of the job-specific component of price, Ed(P). Given that S(E, p) is the surplus value of a match with job-specific component E in aggregate state p, the job meeting rate is defined by the free entry condition, i.e., Table I was computed using the method developed by and reported in Mortensen (1993) . The results of the simulation obtained using these values, the laws of motion given by equations (35)-(38), and Monte Carlo realizations of the aggregate shock generated by the chain specified The results in Table II 
CONCLUSIONS
The model outlined in this paper is characterized by potentially large amounts of job creation and job destruction, due to idiosyncratic shocks that take place independently of the processes that change aggregate conditions. Changes in aggregate conditions, however, do affect the cutoffs that induce firms to open new jobs or close existing ones. So, if we interpret different phases of the cycle as equilibrium at different levels of the parameters (in our formulation, of different values taken by the common component of price, p, and the variance of the idiosyncratic shock, ao), job reallocation can vary over the cycle, even if the processes that cause it do not.
We have shown that at higher common components of labour productivity (alternatively when the aggregate price distribution translates to the right), the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job is higher and the probability that a job is destroyed is lower within given finite lengths of time. An examination of the dynamics of job creation and job destruction when it is known that labour productivity changes randomly has revealed that the anticipation of cyclical change reduces the cyclicality of job creation, and the short-run response of job destruction to shocks increases the cyclicality of job destruction. Although empirical evidence on the cyclical issue is inconclusive, these results are consistent with Haltiwanger's (1990, 1991) findings. Both results can be made stronger if aggregate events also change the degree of dispersion present in idiosyncratic shocks, provided the dispersion of productivities is lower at higher common component of labour productivity. At lower dispersion there is less job destruction, reinforcing the fall in job destruction due to higher common productivity, and less job creation, partially offsetting the higher job creation due to higher productivity. Our simulations, however, have shown that even holding dispersion constant, random changes in common price can proxy reasonable well the cyclical changes found in the U.S. data. In contrast, changes in the dispersion of productivities with constant aggregate productivity do not seem consistent with the finding that job creation and job destruction move in opposite directions during the cycle, so they are unlikely to be the domininant driving force of the unemployment cycle.
The aggregate unemployment model with endogenous job destruction behaves similarly to the standard model with exogeneous job exit, except that now shocks to the aggregate component of the value of product shift the Beveridge curve. Thus, if there are simultaneous aggregate and reallocation shocks, the Beveridge diagram ceases to be as useful a tool of analysis, because the two equilibrium curves in vacancy/unemployment space depend on a similar set of parameters. In these circumstances, the relation between job matchings on the one hand and job vacancies and unemployment on the other might shed more light on the source of shocks than might the relation between the stock of unemployment and the stock of vacancies. The information contained in vacancy/unemployment flow data is potentially more useful in distinguishing between different kinds of shocks than the information contained in the stocks.'0 
The sign of the right-hand side of (A8) is generally ambiguous. 
Therefore, p _ b is sufficient to ensure that when the effect of a on equilibrium v/u is taken into account, Ed is higher when a is higher.
